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Helpless and lonely: Turkey’s attitude towards the war in Syria
Szymon Ananicz
The conflict in Syria, which has lasted since 2011, has become the most significant test of the 
efficiency of Turkey’s foreign policy and the biggest challenge to Turkey’s security in recent 
decades. The lack of a clear prospect of an end to the war does not allow us to come to a fi-
nal conclusion regarding the Syrian civil war’s importance for Turkey. However, it can be said 
today that with the exception of the initial phase of the conflict, Ankara’s influence over the 
course of events in Syria has been limited, and the war itself is evolving in a direction that is 
unfavourable for Turkey: the hostile regime of Bashar al-Assad is still in power, the opposition 
has proved to be an unreliable or even a dangerous ally, and in northern Syria militant jihad-
ist groups and Kurds are gaining importance. It is also quite unlikely that the West will take 
any greater responsibility for stabilising the situation in the region. 
In response to such an unfortunate situation, and out of fear of risking deeper involvement in 
the conflict, during the past year Turkey’s policy towards Syria has been restrained, reactive 
and focused mainly on defending Turkey’s territory. However, this policy offers no security 
guarantees and does not prevent the country’s regional position from weakening, especially 
in the context of the reinforcement of the jihadist militants and the Kurdish autonomy in 
northern Syria. The arguments for Turkey continuing its defensive policy are strong: the coun-
try fears the possible results of an open confrontation with Assad’s forces; most probably it 
could not count on support for such actions from within its own society or its Western allies. 
It also does not have enough acceptance within the anti-Assad opposition circles. On the 
other hand, though, the risk of uncontrolled development of events is still present; the risk 
of confrontations with armed jihadist militants is growing; and the potential operation of 
Turkish forces, either against the jihadists or against Assad’s army, could be considered as 
a method of diverting attention from the political problems with which the AKP government 
has been struggling at home. 
On the threshold of year 4 of the Syrian war
The war between the regime of Bashar al-As-
sad and the rebels has seriously destabilised 
the Middle East. The conflict has spilt over onto 
the territories of Syria’s neighbours: there is 
regular fighting in Lebanon, increased activity 
by Islamic terrorist organisations in Iraq and 
(to a lesser extent) in Turkey, increasing tenden-
cies among Kurds to fight for their autonomy 
in Turkey, and the influx of refugees to all of 
the states neighbouring Syria. The war has also 
fuelled the rivalry among the region’s major ac-
tors, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, as well 
as between actors from other regions, namely 
the West and Russia. 
Currently there seems to be little chance of 
a quick resolution of the war. None of the sides 
involved is able to win. Assad’s forces control 
the state’s strategic territories and resources, 
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and in recent months have been more successful 
on the battlefields thanks to their military ad-
vantage. However, they are not strong enough 
to regain control over the entire country, de-
spite the opposition being scattered and split 
by internal conflicts. It is equally unlikely that 
peace can be reached through negotiations, 
as confirmed by the failure of the talks held in 
Geneva in January and February 2014 between 
the representatives of the government in Da-
mascus and the opposition.
The deadlock has been further reinforced by 
external actors. The potential of the warring 
sides is magnified by their foreign supporters: 
mainly by Iran (together with Hezbollah) and 
Russia, which support Assad; by Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar (and to a smaller extent by the West 
and Turkey) which support the opposition; and 
by Islamic terrorist organisations, their mem-
bers and proponents, who provide recruits and 
weapons to the jihadist militants. Moreover, 
Russia has blocked peace-oriented initiatives 
launched by the West, for example by using 
its right to veto the resolutions adopted by the 
UN Security Council. We may expect that over 
the next few years the war in Syria will affect 
the security, politics and economy of the states 
of the Middle East, and the regional distribu-
tion of power, including the position of Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, Russia, the West and the situation 
of Kurds. The future course of events will be 
significant for Turkey’s position as well.
The evolution of Turkey’s policy towards 
Syria
Turkey’s policy towards the crisis in Syria can 
be divided into three stages. Initially, Ankara 
saw the crisis as an occasion to act like a mod-
ern and influential state, a regional promoter 
of democracy able to appease the socio-politi-
cal tensions which destabilise the Middle East. 
When protests broke out in Syria in the spring 
of 2011, Turkey attempted to use its influence 
over Damascus to convince Bashar al-Assad to 
carry out democratic reforms1. On one hand 
it offered support, while on the other it kept 
reinforcing its negotiating position and ex-
panded its room for manoeuvre by giving shel-
ter to the opposition. When in autumn 2011 it 
turned out that its attempts at persuasion had 
failed, and Assad started to use force to curb 
the demonstrations, Ankara moved to the sec-
ond stage, focused on confrontation. It based 
its approach on the assumption that, similar-
ly to other states covered by the ‘Arab Spring’, 
Syria’s despotic regime would soon be toppled. 
This policy called for actions in various fields, 
including logistical and material support for 
the Syrian National Council, then the strongest 
opposition organisation, and the anti-regime 
Free Syrian Army; reception of refugees in spe-
cially built camps2; and launching a diplomatic 
offensive aimed at mobilising the international 
community to topple Assad3. Ankara remained 
positively neutral towards the armed jihadist 
1 Since the breakthrough in bilateral relations in the late 
1990s – when in response to the threat of war voiced 
by Turkey in connection with Damascus’ support for the 
anti-Turkish Kurdish terrorist organisation the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party PKK, and especially since the AKP came 
to power – the two countries have made attempts to 
improve their mutual relations, e.g. by launching coop-
eration in the fight against terrorism (mainly Kurdish 
separatism), intensifying trade relations, cooperating 
in the management of the Euphrates waters, develop-
ing political relations and abolishing the visa regime. 
See Szymon Ananicz, ‘Turcja wobec konfliktu syryjskie-
go’, Komentarz OSW, 10 October 2012, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2012-10-10/
turcja-wobec-kryzysu-syryjskiego
2 According to the UNHCR, there are nearly 700,000 Syri-
an refugees in Turkey; the Turkish authorities claim that 
the actual number of refugees is around 900,000. 
3 Turkey has called on its Western allies and Arab states to 
establish a no-fly zone in Syria, create a buffer zone in 
the northern part of the country, and provide weapons 
to the opposition. It has launched initiatives at various 
forums including the United Nations, NATO, the Organ-
isation of the Islamic Conference, the Friends of Syria 
group and the League of Arab States.
Turkey’s policy towards the crisis in Syria 
can be divided into three stages: diplomacy, 
confrontation and defence
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groups which had joined the rebellion, hoping 
that they would contribute to the elimination of 
the regime. Officially, the Turkish government 
offered them no support, but at the same time 
it tolerated their presence in Turkey, which has 
become their transit territory and stronghold4. 
Simultaneously Ankara made attempts to pre-
vent a situation in which destabilisation in Syr-
ia would enable the Democratic Union Party 
(PYD), associated with the PKK, to win autono-
my for the two-million strong Kurdish minority 
in the northern part of the country, fearing this 
might be a casus belli. In this period Syria occu-
pied a central place in the actions carried out 
by Turkish diplomacy; it was one of the main 
topics of speeches given by politicians at home 
and abroad. The clear declaration of support 
offered to the pro-democratic forces oppressed 
by the criminal regime was aimed to reinforce 
the AKP’s image as a party which was deter-
mined to defend these values in the eyes of Tur-
key’s foreign partners and the party’s domestic 
electorate.
In mid-2012 Ankara’s policy entered its third 
stage. Turkey gradually moved from active 
confrontation towards a more reactive policy 
restricted to defending the country’s own ter-
ritory, including potential support for actions 
carried out by the opposition and other states, 
albeit without taking any risks associated with 
its own initiatives aimed directly at Assad’s re-
gime. A series of events showed Turkey’s vul-
nerability to retaliatory actions by Damascus 
and its allies, Iran in particular, which gave 
impetus to make changes. In 2012 the conflict 
between the Turkish forces and the Kurdish 
terrorist organisation PKK escalated, reaching 
its highest level since the 1990s (in 2011–2013 
4 It is difficult to verify the media reports suggesting that 
Turkey provides weapons to these groups. However, 
it can be assumed that some of the militants who had 
previously been members of more moderate groups sup-
ported by Ankara later joined ISIS or al-Nusra (along with 
weapons which could have been provided by Turkey). 
nearly 1000 people died in this conflict)5. This 
was possible, among other factors, due to the 
support granted to the PKK by Damascus and 
Tehran. In June 2012 the Syrian army shot down 
a Turkish reconnaissance plane, and in May 
2013 in the border town of Reyhanlı a bomb at-
tack was staged, killing over 50 Turkish citizens. 
Turkey hassuspected Syria of staging the attack. 
These events have demonstrated that the price 
of confrontation with Assad is high. 
Other manifestations of this new policy have 
included the softening of the rhetoric towards 
Damascus, and the non-escalation of tensions 
associated with clashes on cross-border territo-
ries. Ankara decided to refrain from military ac-
tion even after the attack in Reyhanlı6; instead, 
it has used force for defensive purposes alone7. 
The threats of possible retaliations should the 
Tomb of Suleyman Shah (located in a Turkish 
exclave in northern Syria) be desecrated, can be 
interpreted in a similar way. In the international 
arena, Ankara has moved away from promoting 
offensive initiatives and has focused on obtain-
ing security guarantees from NATO, which has 
resulted in the deployment of NATO’s missile 
defence system to Turkey8. It also counted on 
the United States to negotiate with Russia over 
the conditions for bringing an end to the war9. 
5 Data quoted from the International Crisis Group, ‘Crying 
“Wolf”: Why Turkish Fears Need Not Block Kurdish Re-




6 Marek Matusiak, ‘Turkey: Attack on the border with Syr-
ia’, OSW Analyses, 15 May 2013, http://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-05-15/turkey-attack-bor-
der-syria 
7 The Turkish army shot down a Syrian helicopter in Sep-
tember 2013, and a fighter plane in March 2014. Accord-
ing to the Turkish authorities, in both cases the Syrian 
aircraft had intruded into Turkey’s air space. 
8 Krzysztof Strachota, ‘The US and NATO are defending 
Turkey’, OSW Analyses, 19 December 2012, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-12-19/us-and-
nato-are-defending-turkey 
9 Until the failed peace conference held in Geneva in Janu-
ary and February 2014, Turkey had hoped that Washing-
ton would be able to bring an end to the conflict. 
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Moreover, it attempted to revive its relations 
with Iran and Russia (previously it had not con-
sidered these two states as actors in the peace 
process), and since mid-2013 it has consistently 
rejected the accusations formulated by Turkey’s 
foreign partners concerning the country’s pos-
sible support for ISIS and al-Nusra10. Turkey’s 
support for moderate opposition groups has 
become less visible and less frequent. Also, 
Ankara has softened its rhetoric towards the 
actions of the Kurdish PYD in northern Syria: 
Turkey has abandoned its threats of a military 
intervention, even though in the meantime 
(with tacit support from Assad and a certain 
degree of assistance from the PKK) the PYD 
has managed to gain control over north-east-
ern Syria, after which it proclaimed autonomy 
(in January 2014) of the Kurdish regions on 
these territories. Ankara’s response was limited 
to closing border crossings with the territories 
controlled by the Kurds.
It is difficult to judge whether Turkey is like-
ly to continue this cautious, defensive policy 
with a similar consistency to that which it has 
demonstrated in the last two years. Certain 
doubts can be supposed, in associate with 
some difficult-to-verify media reports, secret-
ly recorded declarations by Turkish politicians 
and representatives of uniformed services, 
as well as leaked reports suggesting the deep, 
offensive involvement of Turkish services in 
the fight against Assad and the jihadist mil-
itants11. Should these revelations prove true, 
it is likely that Turkey’s involvement in the con-
flict would increase. 
10 According to media reports, at the end of 2013 Turkey 
sent the EU states a report saying that in that year it 
had detained and deported 1100 European citizens 
who had come to Turkey to join the jihadist organisa-
tions operating in Syria. http://www.todayszaman.com/
news-332877-turkey-deports-1100-european-fighters-
to-countries-of-origin.html
11 Cf. Seymour M. Hersh, ‘The Red Line and the Rat Line’, 
London Review of Books, Vol. 36, No 8, 17 April 2014, 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n08/seymour-m-hersh/the-
red-line-and-the-rat-line
Little room for manoeuvre 
Ankara has treated the Syrian war as a seri-
ous threat, in the face of which it is practically 
helpless. The vulnerability to hostile actions by 
Assad and his supporters, the situation in Syria, 
in the international arena and within Turkey it-
self make it increasingly difficult for Ankara to 
conduct an active policy towards the conflict. 
A significant barrier to this is the internal divi-
sions within the opposition, the increased sig-
nificance of radical factions in the rebel groups 
(the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) 
and the al-Nusra Front associated with al-Qaeda) 
and the resulting inability of the opposition to 
act in concert, which would be exacerbated if 
such actions were to be supervised by Ankara12. 
In particular, it was the strengthening of the 
armed jihadist groups, at the expense of those 
circles which Ankara initially saw as Assad’s pos-
sible successors, that generated serious doubts 
in Turkish thinking as to whether the fall of the 
Syrian regime would be beneficial for Turkey. 
In this scenario, extreme Islamic groups would 
have a great chance of becoming the main ac-
tor in the new Syria, which would pose a se-
rious threat to Turkey13. Moreover, even the 
more moderate part of the Syrian opposition 
(the Free Syrian Army, the Islamic Front, the Syr-
12 Until 2014 the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) 
claimed that it belonged to al-Qaeda. However in Feb-
ruary 2014, al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri issued 
a statement in which he denied any ties with ISIS. 
13 Islamic radicals are particularly active in the northern 
and eastern part of the country, which is close to the 
border with Turkey. They have proved very determined 
in their fight with the anti-Assad forces, and additionally 
ISIS has carried out military actions against the remain-
ing rebel groups (including the Free Syrian Army, al-Nus-
ra and the Kurdish PYD). US intelligence sources estimate 
that of the 75,000–110,000 strong group of rebels, some 
26,000 are Islamic extremists. Around 7000 of them 
have come to Syria from abroad. It can be assumed that 
most of them reached Syria via Turkey, benefiting from 
the latter’s geographical location, the ease of crossing 
the border with Syria, the favourable attitude towards 
the rebels, the liberal visa regime and the convenient air 
connections. See the testimony of Director of National 
Intelligence James Clapper on 29 January to the US sen-
ate: http://www.senate.gov/isvp/?type=live&comm=in-
tel&filename=intel012914&stt=38:15
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ian National Coalition) have proved to be more 
susceptible to the influence of Saudi Arabia (and 
to a lesser extent Qatar) than that of Ankara. 
Contrary to initial calculations, it has also be-
come clear that the West is not interested in be-
coming more involved in the conflict, as a result 
of which Turkey has become isolated and more 
prone to the risk of confrontation with Assad’s 
forces and their supporters – Russia and Iran. 
This has been clearly confirmed by the restrained 
reactions of the United States and the EU to 
the use of chemical weapons and the reports 
of mass killing in jails controlled by Assad’s re-
gime14. Additionally, in recent months the West 
has devoted much of its attention to the crisis 
in Ukraine. Furthermore, the worsening relations 
with some of the Arab states which are hostile 
towards Damascus has limited Turkey’s potential 
for action. For instance, diplomatic tensions in its 
relations with Saudi Arabia make it difficult for 
Ankara to cooperate with the Syrian opposition, 
even though the two states’ interests in the con-
text of the conflict are similar15.
14 An attack with the use of chemical weapons was carried 
out on the Syrian town of Guta in August 2013. The sus-
pected perpetrators are Assad’s forces. Although Barack 
Obama had previously referred to the use of chemical 
weapons as a “red line”, the crossing of which the US 
would consider a casus belli, Washington refrained from 
a military intervention. In January 2014 evidence came 
to light confirming that around 11 individuals had been 
killed, most of them starved, in regime-controlled jails. 
This report was also met with a muted response by 
the West. 
15 Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia want Bashar al-Assad’s 
regime to fall; they fear armed jihadist groups and have 
called for the international community to intervene and 
end the conflict. The main differences between the two 
states include their relations towards the Muslim Broth-
The domestic situation in Turkey has not been 
particularly favourable for the state’s active 
policy. The previous confrontation-oriented 
approach had little public support and was 
generally considered wrong and pointless16. 
The renewal of the peace process with the 
Kurdish minority in Turkey in early 2013 makes 
it difficult for Ankara to prevent the establish-
ment of a Kurdish autonomy in northern Syr-
ia17. The socio-political crisis, which started 
with mass protests in May and June 2013 and 
was further aggravated by the corruption scan-
dal which broke out in December, has divert-
ed the government’s attention from foreign 
policy, and discouraged the country’s leaders 
from continuing unpopular actions, especially 
in the pre-election period18. The confrontation 
between the ruling AKP and Fethullah Gülen’s 
Hizmet movement has translated into rivalry 
between the state’s services, in particular be-
tween the intelligence service (on the govern-
ment side) and the police and gendarmerie 
(on the side of Gülen), which has limited Tur-
key’s freedom to act in Syria. This can be il-
lustrated by the attempts made by the police 
and gendarmerie to stop supplies being sent to 
Syrian rebels by Turkish intelligence services19. 
 
erhood; Turkey considers this organisation a partner, 
while Saudi Arabia refers to it as an enemy. The two 
countries had a dispute over this issue when the Muslim 
Brotherhood government in Egypt was toppled. 
16 A Turkish opinion poll conducted in September 2012 
showed that 56% of the respondents assessed Turkey’s 
policy towards Syria as negative, and 28% supported 
it. See ‘Türkiye Siyasal Durum Araştırması’, Metropoll, 
September 2012, http://www.metropoll.com.tr/report/
turkiye-siyasal-durum-arastirmasi-eylul-2012. 
17 As part of the Turkish-Kurdish peace process, which has 
been ongoing since 2013, the PKK has indirectly held 
talks with the Turkish government on the regulation 
of the situation of the Kurdish minority. Although the 
fighting has ended, the authorities still consider the PKK 
as a dangerous rival. 
18 In March 2014 local elections were held, presidential 
elections have been scheduled for this summer, and par-
liamentary elections for 2015.
19 Semih Idiz, ‘Syria-bound trucks put spotlight on Tur-
key’, Al-Monitor, 21 January 2014, http://www.al-mon-
itor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/turkey-trucks-atten-
tion-syria.html 
The vulnerability to hostile actions carried 
out by Assad and his supporters, the sit-
uation in Syria, in the international arena 
and in Turkey itself are making it increas-
ingly difficult for Ankara to conduct an ac-
tive policy towards the conflict.
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It can be expected that the disclosure of the 
recordings from a meeting held at the Turkish 
foreign ministry, during which the possibility of 
staging a provocation in order to create a pre-
text for an intervention in Syria was discussed, 
has made the public additionally sensitive to 
the issues of the army and special services be-
coming involved in the government’s actions20. 
Main challenges to security
It seems that for the time being, the main chal-
lenge to Ankara will be the strengthening of 
armed jihadist groups in northern Syria and 
in Turkey itself. Turkey has become increas-
ingly hostile towards these groups. However, 
launching decisive actions against the jihad-
ists would probably expose Turkey to the risk 
of retaliation on their part. This would be all 
the more dangerous as they can move freely to 
Turkey and organise their actions, for instance 
by recruiting militants from the several hun-
dred thousand-strong group of Syrian refugees 
on Turkish territory. The growing threat can 
be confirmed by the cases of exchange of fire 
in March this year between the militants and the 
police in central Turkey and Istanbul which killed 
a number of police officers and Turkish civilians. 
Combating Islamic militants is difficult, due for 
example to the problems with controlling the 
900-kilometre-long border with Syria and veri-
fying whether individual militants belong to any 
of the groups. On the other hand, continuing the 
policy of latent tolerance for the presence of such 
groups in Syria and Turkey could strengthen their 
position in the region and compromise Ankara’s 
relations with the West, which is pushing for 
a more active fight against terrorist groups.
20 See: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/27/us-syr-
ia-crisis-turkey-idUSBREA2Q17420140327, a record of 
a part of the meeting between the minister of for-
eign affairs, a secretary of state at the MFA, the head 
of the intelligence service and deputy chief of staff 
in English: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/turkey-you-
tube-ban-full-transcript-leaked-syria-war-conversa-
tion-between-erdogan-officials-1442161, a record of 
the entire meeting in Turkish: part 1 http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=pfm3XTNVcFw, part 2 http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=zTDtxvJ6kXU
Another challenge to Turkey’s security and re-
gional position will be the gradual reinforce-
ment of the Kurdish autonomy supervised by 
the PYD in northern Syria. Turkey’s room for 
manoeuvre is limited in this case also: a con-
frontation with the PYD would mean re-start-
ing the war with the PKK on Turkey’s own terri-
tory, while a policy of non-involvement would 
strengthen the PKK’s regional position at the 
expense of Ankara and its ally Masoud Barzani. 
The PKK/PYD’s successes have fuelled new as-
pirations among Turkish Kurds and reinforced 
their negotiating position in their attempts 
at establishing political and cultural autonomy 
in Turkey, while in the same way limiting the 
government’s ability to manage the Kurdish is-
sue on its own. Moreover, if the current peace 
process does not develop as they would expect, 
the PKK might consider this area their shel-
ter and a stronghold for carrying out actions 
against Turkey. The creation of a Kurdish auton-
omy in Syria would also considerably weaken 
Turkey’s regional position. 
Conclusions
From Ankara’s perspective, any further de-
velopment of the Syrian conflict is highly un-
favourable. It has been over three years since 
the war began, and none of the elements of 
Ankara’s initial plan (the rapid fall of Assad’s re-
gime, the victory of the moderate opposition, 
Turkey’s major role in building a new Syria) has 
been realised; moreover it seems that none 
of them will ever be realised. 
The action of jihadist militants and the 
gradual reinforcement of the Kurdish au-
tonomy in northern Syria pose significant 
challenges to Turkey’s security.
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The war has weakened Ankara’s regional po-
sition and demonstrated that Turkey’s aspira-
tions to playthe role of a regional power were 
excessive. Turkey has failed to win the status 
of leader in its immediate neighbourhood. 
So far it has lost the contest for influence in Syr-
ia not only with Iran and Russia, but also with 
Saudi Arabia. Ankara’s unsuccessful Syrian pol-
icy has considerably deepened its isolation in 
the Middle East. It is particularly important to 
note that these failures have been combined 
with the freezing of relations with Egypt, Isra-
el and the deterioration of relations with Iran, 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq (excluding Kurdistan). 
As a result, over the last three years Turkey’s 
room for manoeuvre in the Middle East has 
been greatly reduced.
Another heavy burden for Turkey will be its 
domestic situation. Lack of public support for 
more active involvement in the conflict – espe-
cially in the pre-election period – along with 
the destabilisation of the state structures, 
will limit Ankara’s ability to take the initiative 
in the Syrian conflict. It is likely that, at least 
in the short term, Turkey will continue its pol-
icy based on the defence of its own territory 
and non-confrontation.
